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Abstract
This paper provides an experimental test of a theory of endogenous network forma-
tion. A group of subjects face a decision problem under uncertainty. The subjects are
endowed with a private information about the fundamentals of the problem, and they
are supposed to make a decision one after the other. The key feature of the experiment
is that a subject can observe the decisions of the preceding subjects by forming links.
A link is costly, yet it enables a subject to observe previous decisions of those to whom
he is linked. We show that subjects respond to changes in the information structure
and the cost of link formation in the expected manner. However, we also show that
behavior systematically deviates from the Bayesian benchmark as subjects form more
links than theory predicts. Subjects also exhibit a tendency to conform rather than
follow their own information. In order to explain this pattern, we provide an econo-
metric model that posits that subjects care about their relative standing in the group.
We show that the modified model provides a better fit than a standard QRE.
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1 Introduction
Evidence that social networks are important in disseminating information has been found in
many contexts. Kelly and O´ Gra´da [24] demonstrate the importance of information networks
in market panics using data from two panics in 1850s’ New York. Foster and Rosenzweig
[16], Conley and Udry [11], and Munshi [30] show that technology diffusion is driven by an
underlying social learning process. In particular, Conley and Udry [11] report the results
of field work in rural areas of Ghana indicating that the main channel for the adoption of
new technology in an agricultural sector is social learning through networks. Also, it is
well-documented in the labor economics literature (see Ioannides and Loury [21]) that social
networks are the main source of information about jobs. These are just a few examples that
demonstrate the significance of such questions as:
(1) How does the network structure affect the dissemination of information?
(2) How do social networks form, as far as information aggregation is concerned?
The answers to these questions are sought via the theory of the economics of social
networks.1 There are a number of studies concerning the first question (viz. Bala and
Goyal [1], and Gale and Kariv [18]). These papers address such questions as: how does
information propagates? and, how do agents learn from each other in exogenously given
network structures? C¸elen, Choi and Kariv [10] attempts to answer the second question.
C¸elen et al. [10] extends the canonical social learning model in order to analyze the role of
information externality on the formation of networks, as well as the impact of the dynamic
evolution of networks on learning dynamics. The present paper carefully modifies C¸elen
et al. [10] to design an experiment that contributes to the study of endogenous network
formation in a pure information externality environment.
In the canonical social learning model, agents receive private signals regarding the state
of the world and then make decisions sequentially, after having observed the action choices
of all or some of their predecessors. If agents are Bayesian, they infer valuable information
from their observations, often leading to herd behavior or informational cascades. A critical
assumption of these models is that the interaction between agents is exogenously determined.
This particular assumption is in contrast with many real-life situations where agents form
their own networks and choose whom to observe. Put differently, in order to acquire more
information, an agent can decide to form links to other agents to observe their decisions
and thereafter make his decision. This is what we mean by saying that the network evolves
endogenously.
Our experiment consists of a group of four subjects who sequentially make decisions on
the same problem. Each subject is (potentially) endowed with a piece of valuable information
1For recent and comprehensive surveys of the literature see Jackson [22, 23].
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regarding the fundamentals of the problem. In addition to having this private information,
each subject, before making a decision, is allowed to form links to his predecessors. Forming
a link is costly, yet it entitles a subject to observe the actions of those with whom he linked.
While the subjects cannot observe the actions without a link, they can observe the structure
of the network that evolved until it is their decision turn. This is an important feature of our
design, since the structure itself divulges the degree of the network’s informativeness, should
the subject decide to form any links. We have two different treatments: the full information
treatment (fi) and the partial information treatment (pi). The two treatments differ in that
in the former treatment, subjects always receive an informative signal, while in the latter
they receive a signal with probability less than one. This allows us to analyze how subjects
react to changes in the quality of information in this environment.
In a nutshell, each subject decides first whether or not to form any links and then,
upon observing the actions through his links, makes an action decision. This two-step
procedure gives us the leverage to pose many interesting questions: how do subjects search for
information, how do subjects respond to the cost of link formation? how much information
is transmitted by the network? how do subjects aggregate the information obtained from
any link decisions?
Section 2 lays out the model that we implement in the laboratory and provides the
predictions of the theory. We first describe what we call the network formation game.
Then we elaborate on the specifics of link formation. In particular we explain the details
of link formation and the way agents can collect information through what we call the
Bayesian Sequential Link Procedure. Finally, we state the theoretical predictions of the
model concerning the behavior of the Bayesian agents.
Section 3 explains what happens in the laboratory, as well as how it happens. We also
explain some of our choices concerning the experimental design. In Section 4, we provide a
descriptive analysis of the observed link and action decisions of the subjects in our experi-
ment. This is where we show that there are systematic deviations from the Bayes-rational
benchmark of Section 2. For example, in both information treatments, informed subjects in
the second position link to the first subject approximately 30% of the time, although it is not
optimal for any positive cost. Remarkably, though, when the observed action and the signal
of the second subject disagree, there is a strong tendency in the fi treatment to conform to
the decision of the first subject, while there is no such tendency for the partial information
treatment. We also show that subjects display herd behavior in link formation: that is, the
third subject is much more likely to link if he observes a link between the subjects in the
first and second positions; the fourth subject almost always links when the third subject has
a link to the second, who is also linked to the first. Finally, we show that subjects do not
necessarily form links to the most informative node; instead, they prefer to link to the larger
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sub-network. All of these deviations should not be construed to mean that subjects’ behavior
is completely erratic. Indeed, subjects respond to changes in the cost of link formation just
as the theory predicts. Moreover, by looking across information treatments, we are able to
see that subjects do respond to information. For example, herding in link formation is less
pronounced in the partial information treatment than in the full information treatment.
The observations gleaned from our descriptive analysis in Section 4 lead us to a number of
hypotheses that we attempt to rigourously test in Section 5. To explain the linking behavior
that we observe, we reformulate our model to incorporate the relative income hypothesis a`
la Duesenberry [14]. In particular, we argue that a subject is motivated to form a link above
and beyond the standard reasons found in the Bayesian benchmark because he wishes to
compare his expected earnings to those of his predecessor(s). We parameterize this kind of
behavior with the parameter α: when α > 0, subjects care about their relative standing,
while for α = 0, the model reduces to a more standard Quantal Response Equilibrium model,
which is also discussed in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6 we offer some concluding remarks
and directions for future research.
2 Theoretical Background
The design of our experiment is based on a theory of network formation through information
transmission. In this section, we introduce the model and carefully discuss its theoretical
predictions. These predictions offer the rational benchmark for the analysis of subjects’
behavior in the laboratory.
2.1 Network Formation Game
The basic structure of the problem—which we call the network formation game—is as
follows. There are two equally likely states of the world θ ∈ {−1, 1}. The game consists of
four agents who are randomly assigned to a position in a decision line indexed by i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Agents act sequentially in a predetermined order. The agents’ problem involves correctly
identifying the true state of the world. Precisely, each agent i is supposed to take an action
ai ∈ {−1, 1}, which we call the action decision. If an agent’s action matches the true state,
then he receives a payoff m > 0; otherwise his payoff is zero. Thus, we can represent the
preferences of agent i by the utility function
ui(ai; θ) =
{
m if ai = θ,
0 otherwise.
4
Before he makes a decision, agent i receives a private signal σi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. We say that the
agent is informed when the signal he receives is either −1 or 1. The signals σi ∈ {−1, 1}
are informative about the true state because, conditional on the true state, the probability
that the signal matches the state is p = 2/3. In contrast, the signal σi = 0 is uninformative
because, given σi = 0, the probability of state θ = −1 and θ = 1 are both 1/2. Hence, the
agent cannot distinguish the states of the world based on his signal. Therefore, we say that
agent i is uninformed if he receives the signal σi = 0. Finally, we assume that an agent is
informed with probability q ∈ (0, 1], and uninformed with probability 1− q.
The signals that agents receive are independently and identically distributed conditional
on the true state. Table 1 summarizes the probabilities with which an agent receives each
signal conditional on the state of the world.
Table 1: Information Structure
σ θ
−1 1
1 q/3 2q/3
0 1− q 1− q
−1 2q/3 q/3
After receiving a private signal but before making the action decision, an agent has
the option to observe action decisions made by the preceding agents in the decision line.
The decision on whether to observe any of the preceding agents’ actions—and, if so, whose
actions to observe—is called the link decision. We make two assumptions on the process
of information gathering through link formation.
(1) First, link decisions are assumed to be public information: that is, each agent
observes all the link decisions made by the preceding agents but not their action
decisions.
(2) Second, by forming a link to one of the preceding agents, an agent not only
observes the action decision of this agent, but also all the actions that this agent
observed through his link decision(s). The cost of each link is assumed to be
c ≥ 0.
The next section provides a detailed description of the process of link formation.
2.2 Bayesian Sequential Link Procedure
For each agent the process of link formation is sequential. In other words, if an agent can
form more than one link, he forms the links one after the other by comparing the potential
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benefit and cost of an additional link at each stage.
Figure 1: Bayesian Sequential Link
Procedure: An Example
b b b1 2 3
Let us be more specific and explain what we call the Bayesian Sequential Link Pro-
cedure (bslp) through an example, illustrated in Figure 1. It is the fourth agent’s turn
to move and he observes the following: the second agent did not form a link to the first,
and took his action based on his private information. The third agent formed a link to the
second; yet, after observing the action of the second, he did not form a link to the first
agent. Therefore, he took his action based on the information deduced from the second
agent’s action and his private information. There are two links that the fourth can form: a
link to the third agent, through which he can observe the action of the third and the second,
and a link to the first agent, through which he can observe the action of the first agent.2
According to bslp, the fourth agent evaluates the problem in the following way. Based
on his own information, he decides whether it is optimal to incur c and form a link to the
third. But in doing so he keeps in mind that he could continue and form a link to the first
by incurring the cost c again. More precisely, he considers all possible action profiles that he
can observe through his link to the third agent. Also, conditional on his private information,
he knows the probability with which he can observe each action profile. Furthermore, for
each one of these contingencies, he considers the action profile he can observe by a second
link and decides whether he would form the second link or not as if he is at that situation.
Finally, with this continuation value in mind, he decides whether to form his first link or
not. In what follows, we will explain this procedure more formally. All the results that we
will report in the following sections are based on the use of the formula we derive here.
As is the case in the example, forming a link is equivalent to saying that the agent observes
the outcome (the action profile) of an experiment (forming a link). For the purposes of the
present paper, it is enough to look at the case where there are two random variables, X1, X2,
that are independent conditional on θ, but not necessarily identical. The realizations of
the random variables are denoted by x1 and x2 respectively. Therefore, an agent facing
X1 and X2 first decides whether to take an optimal action simply based on his private
information, or to experiment X1. If he decides to experiment X1, for any realization x1, he
specifies whether to take an optimal action, or to further experiment X2. If he decides to
experiment X2, for all realizations x2, he specifies the optimal action he should take.
2 By Blackwell’s [6] celebrated theorem, it is clear that it is not optimal to form a link to the second,
rather than the third. Similarly, it is not optimal to form a link to the first and then to the third agent.
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Let s0 = (σ), s1 = (σ, x1), s2 = (σ, x1, x2) denote the information nodes where the agent
observes only his private information, his private information and the realization of X1,
and his private information, the realization of X1 and of X2, respectively. We denote the
maximum expected utility an agent can get at a node s ∈ {s0, s1, s2} without further exper-
imentation by
v(s) := max
{
Pr(θ = 1|s),Pr(θ = −1|s)
}
m. (1)
Also, at node sj , where j ∈ {0, 1} the ex ante maximum expected utility from further
experimentation is
v¯(sj) :=
∑
sj+1
Pr(sj+1|sj)max
{
v(sj+1), v¯(sj+1)− c
}
, (2)
since at each sj an agent compares v(sj) against v¯(sj)− c to decide whether to experiment
Xj+1 or to take the optimal action at sj. To capture this, we define what we refer to as the
value of information from further experimentation by
v(sj) := v¯(sj)− v(sj)− c for j ∈ {0, 1},
v(s2) := v¯(s2).
(3)
Therefore at sj , an agent decides to further experiment if v(sj) > 0, otherwise he takes the
optimal action at sj without experimenting Xj+1.
By using the equations (1), (2), (3) and backward induction, we can fully describe the
optimal strategy of an agent. The following proposition formally states the complete char-
acterization of bslp that we illustrated.
Proposition 1. The optimal policy of Bayesian sequential link procedure for an agent is
characterized by a pair (τ, a∗) such that
τ = min
{
j ∈ {0, 1, 2} : v(sj) ≤ 0
}
, (4)
a∗ ∈ argmaxa
{∑
θ Pr(θ|sτ )u(a, θ)
}
. (5)
Proposition 1, and the value of information, as defined by (3), provide us with the full
characterization of the decision problem. In other words, an agent stops at the first node at
which the value of information is negative; otherwise, he keeps forming links. If the agent
stops at the node sτ , then he takes the action that maximizes his expected utility given his
information. The equilibrium results that we present in the following section are derived by
use of this characterization.
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2.3 Theoretical Predictions
In this section we state the equilibrium behavior of agents i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} as corollaries to
Proposition 1. Furthermore, we discuss the equilibrium networks that can be observed in
the network game. The proofs of the corollaries are in Appendix A.
First Agent. The decision problem of the first agent is easy because there is no preceding
agent; thus, he takes an action based only on his private signal. If the first agent is informed,
then he follows his signal. If he is uninformed, he randomizes between the two possible
actions. Therefore, unless q = 1, the second agent cannot determine the status of the first
agent as either informed or uninformed. Figure 2 depicts this situation. We reserve the
diamond to refer to an agent whose status cannot be determined.
Figure 2: After the First Agent
r1(1.a)
Second Agent. The second agent faces a more interesting problem because he has the
option of observing the first agent’s action. Here, optimal behavior depends on whether or
not the agent is informed. If the second agent is informed, then by applying Proposition 1
we find that he does not form a link for any positive cost. Intuitively, this is easy to see:
if the second agent incurs the cost c and forms a link to the first, either he will observe an
action that is the same as his own private information or he will observe the opposite action.
In the former case, he will take the action that he would have taken without a link. In the
latter, for any q < 1, he will still favor the action that is in line with his information. At
best, when q = 1, he will become indifferent between the two actions. This suggests that
forming a link does not provide any value to an informed second agent.
On the other hand, if he is uninformed, then it is optimal to form a link to the first agent
if the cost is low enough, because there is a positive probability that the first is informed. If
the cost is high, an uninformed second agent does not form a link.
Corollary 1 summarizes the optimal behavior of the second agent.
Corollary 1. The optimal decision rule of the second agent is characterized as follows:
1. Let σ2 ∈ {−1, 1} and q ∈ (0, 1]. For any c > 0, the second agent does not form a link
and takes action a2 = σ2.
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2. Let σ2 = 0 and q ∈ (0, 1]. There exists a threshold c
∗ = qm/6 such that for any c < c∗,
the second agent links to the first and takes action a2 = a1; if c ≥ c
∗, the second agent
does not form a link and randomizes between the two actions.
Notice that the threshold value c∗ increases linearly in the probability of being informed,
q, and in the payoff from a correct action, m. Intuitively, when q is higher, the first agent is
more likely to be informed and thus, from the perspective of an uninformed second agent, it
becomes more valuable to form a link to the first agent. In a similar vein, when the payoff
from a correct decision is larger, the same amount of information increases the potential
benefit from that information. Figure 3 depicts the networks that can emerge in the equilib-
rium for 0 < c < c∗, and c ≥ c∗. The square indicates the event in which it can be deduced
that the agent is uninformed, while the circle indicates that he is informed.
Figure 3: After the Second Agent
0 < c < c∗
r r1 2(2.a)
r b1 2(2.b)
c ≥ c∗
r r1 2(2.c)
Third Agent. Note that when c < c∗, the third (and fourth) agent(s) can discern whether
the second agent is uninformed ((2.a) in Figure 3) or informed ((2.b) in Figure 3) simply
by observing the network structure emerging from his link decision. As such, the network
structure itself contains valuable information and affects significantly the behavior of all
agents coming after the second agent.
The decision problem for the third agent is interesting because the network structure be-
comes more significant in determining the optimal behavior. When the third agent observes
a link between the second and the first agents, he rationally infers that the second agent is
uninformed and his action conveys no information. In this case, his problem is equivalent to
the second agent’s problem: if he is informed, he does not form a link for any positive cost,
whereas if he is uninformed, he forms a link to the second agent for c < c∗.3 The networks
(3.a) and (3.b) in Figure 4 exhibit these situations.
Suppose that 0 < c < c∗ and the third agent faces the network (2.b) in Figure 3. When
the third agent observes that there is no link between the first and the second agents, he
3 Note that it is also optimal to form a link to the first agent and the third observes only the first agent’s
action. In order to get around an unnecessary multiplicity of equilibria, we assume that an agent starts to
form a link to the closest agent in a line.
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Figure 4: After the Third Agent
0 < c < c∗∗
r b b1 2 3(3.d)
r b r1 2 3(3.c)
r r b1 2 3(3.b)
r r r1 2 3(3.a)
c∗∗ ≤ c < c∗
r r r1 2 3(3.a)
r r b1 2 3(3.b)
r b b1 2 3(3.e)
r b r1 2 3(3.f)
c∗ ≤ c
r r r1 2 3(3.g)
knows that the second agent is informed. However, he knows that the first is informed only
with probability q ∈ (0, 1]. Therefore, an uninformed third agent forms a link to the second
and imitates his action ((3.c) and (3.f) in Figure 4). Note that after observing the second
agent, the uninformed third agent is exactly the same as an informed second agent. Hence,
a link to the first agent is worthless.
On the other hand, if the third agent is informed, we find that the value of information
is positive only when the cost is low enough (i.e. c < c∗∗ = 2qm/39.) Suppose that c < c∗∗.
An informed third agent starts forming a link to the second. If he finds out that the signal
of the second agent is the same as his, he imitates the second’s action without forming a link
to the first ((3.c) in Figure 4.) Otherwise, he proceeds with a link to the first agent ((3.d)
in Figure 4.) Since there is a chance an informed third agent does not form a link to the
third, the fourth agent facing the network (3.c) in Figure 4 cannot tell whether the third is
informed or not. On the other hand, when c∗∗ ≤ c < c∗, an informed third agent does not
form a link to the second agent ((3.e) shown in Figure 4.)
Finally, when the cost is high enough (i.e., c > c∗), the third agent observes the empty
network where the second did not form a link. Because the third agent cannot distinguish
whether the second agent is informed, he faces two opportunities for linking with equal
amounts of information ((3.g) in Figure 4.) However, due to the high cost, it is never
optimal for him to form any link, regardless of whether he is informed.
We summarize this discussion in the following Corollary.
Corollary 2. The optimal decision rule of the third agent is characterized as follows:
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1. Suppose there is a link between the first and the second agents.
(a) Let σ3 ∈ {−1, 1} and q ∈ (0, 1]. Then, for any c > 0, the third agent does not
form a link and takes action a3 = σ3.
(b) Let σ3 = 0 and q ∈ (0, 1]. Then, for any c < c
∗, the third agent links to the
second and takes action a3 = a2; if c ≥ c
∗, the third agent does not form a link
and randomizes between the two actions.
2. Suppose there is no link between the first and the second agents.
(a) Let σ3 ∈ {−1, 1} and q ∈ (0, 1].
i. There exists a threshold c∗∗ = 2qm/39 such that for any c < c∗∗, the third
agent links to the second agent. If a2 = σ3, then he does not form a link to
the first and takes action a3 = a2; if a2 6= σ3, then he links to the first and
takes action a3 = a1.
ii. For any c ≥ c∗∗, the third agent does not form a link and takes action a3 = σ3.
(b) Let σ3 = 0 and q ∈ (0, 1].
i. For any c < c∗, the third agent links to the second and takes action a3 = a2.
ii. For any c ≥ c∗, the third agent does not form a link and randomizes between
the two actions.
Fourth Agent. Since most of our attention will be focused on the first three agents in
the analysis of the experimental data, we will not provide a full characterization of optimal
behavior for agents in the fourth position. We can point out, however, that often the problem
of the fourth agent will be strategically equivalent to either the second or the third agent.
For example, consider the case where the cost of link formation is low enough, and the fourth
agent observes the network displayed in Figure 5.
Figure 5: The Fourth Agent’s Problem:
An Example
b b b1 2 3
Given this network, the fourth agent can infer that the second agent was informed. He
also can infer that the signals of the second and third must have disagreed (since the third
agent also formed a link to the first). Therefore, the signals of the second and third essentially
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cancel each other out, leaving the only relevant signal that of the first agent—exactly as it
is for the second agent. Therefore, if the fourth agent is informed, he should not link for any
positive cost, while if he is uninformed, he should link provided that c is small enough. To
be sure, there are situations in which the fourth agent’s problem is not equivalent to one of
his predecessors. However, since this is not our main focus, and the intuition is relatively
straightforward, we will omit such details.
3 Experimental Design
The experiment was run at the Experimental Economics Laboratory of the Center for Exper-
imental Social Sciences (C.E.S.S.) at New York University. The 72 subjects were recruited
from undergraduate classes at New York University and had no previous experience in social
learning experiments. In each session, after subjects read the instructions they were also
read aloud by an experimental administrator.4 Each session lasted for about one hour and
fifteen minutes and each subject participated in only one session. An $8.00 participation
fee and subsequent earnings, which averaged about $13.60, were paid in private at the end
of the session. Throughout the experiment, we ensured anonymity and effective isolation of
subjects in order to minimize any interpersonal influences that could stimulate uniformity
of behavior.5
In each session, subjects played the network formation game described in section 2.1, for
40 independent rounds. At the beginning of each session, subjects’ positions were randomly
assigned to either 1, 2, 3 or 4. Moreover, their positions were held fixed for the duration
of the experiment. In each round, the cost of link formation, in experimental points, was
randomly drawn by the computer uniformly from the set {0, 2, . . . , 18, 20}.
In our experiment, we conducted two treatments, which we call the full information
treatment (fi) and the partial information treatment (pi). In treatment fi, all the subjects
received an informative signal (i.e., q = 1), while in treatment pi we set q = 2/3 so there was a
chance of a subject receiving an uninformative signal. In all treatments, the informativeness
of the signal was held fixed at p = 2/3, and the cost of each link was determined as described
above. Table 2 summarizes the details of our experiment.
In each round, subjects earned m = 100 points for correctly guessing the state and 0
points otherwise. Subjects’ net point total was determined by subtracting the appropriate
number of points for each link that a subject made from the points collected in that round
4 At the end of the first round, subjects were asked if there were any misunderstandings. No subject
reported any problems with understanding the procedures or using the computer program.
5 Participants’ work stations were isolated by cubicles making it impossible for participants to observe
others’ screens or to communicate. We also made sure that all remained silent throughout the session. At
the end of a session, participants were paid in private according to the number of their working-stations.
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Table 2: Summary of Experiments
Number of
Subjects
c q p
Number of
Rounds
Session 1 (fi) 20 Random 1 2/3 40
Session 2 (fi) 16 Random 1 2/3 40
Session 3 (pi) 20 Random 2/3 2/3 40
Session 4 (pi) 16 Random 2/3 2/3 40
for guessing the state. At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly selected three
rounds for which subjects would be paid. The total number of points was then converted
back to dollars at the rate of $1.00 = 15 points.
3.1 Some Remarks on The Design
Subjects’ Positions. In the experiment, the subjects engage in a two-step decision pro-
cess. Our decision to fix the subjects’ position throughout the session aims to allow them
to develop a strategy and to play accordingly. Therefore, for fixed p and q, subjects decide
whom to link at different levels of cost. It is critically important to note that in a given
session, there are either 16 or 20 subjects, and the groups (of four subjects) are reshuﬄed at
each round. Therefore, a subject knows that at each round he is a member of a (possibly)
different group. This is how we avoid any collusive behavior in the experiment.
Random Cost. As section 2.3 discussed in detail, the cost of link formation is one of
the critical parameters that affects rational behavior according to bslp. Therefore, having
a subject play at different cost levels for 40 rounds allows us to observe how his behavior
responds to the cost of link formation. The costs were chosen so that subjects in each (non-
trivial) position would experience link formation costs such that, according to bslp, the
optimal action is to form a link (if c is low) or not form a link (if c is high).
Treatments fi & pi. Like the level of cost, different values of q generate different behav-
iors, according to bslp.6 The two treatments fi and pi give us the opportunity to compare,
across treatments, the effect of varying the probability with which subjects receive a private
signal and determining whether the predicted comparative statics hold true.
6 The exact behavioral differences are evidenced in the threshold costs of link formation. In general, the
higher the probability that subjects receive signals, the higher the threshold cost.
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Payoffs. We employ a random lottery incentive system in our experiment as we randomly
choose three rounds to determine the payoffs of the subjects. Cubitt et al. [12] demonstrates
that this incentive scheme generates reliable data. Furthermore, it has many advantages.
First, it helps us to generate a large data set while economizing on cost. Second, and more
importantly, it assures homogenous behavior during the experiment by mitigating any wealth
effects. For instance, had a subject earned many points in earlier decision rounds, his or her
behavior might be distorted in the final rounds of the session. Instead, the random lottery
incentive scheme makes each round equally important, so behavior should be less history
dependent.
4 Descriptive Analysis
We start our analysis with a basic description of the experimental data. We organize our
presentation by focusing separately on the behavior of the subjects at each decision turn.
Our goal is to have a first look at the subjects’ behavior and to develop the hypotheses that
we test thoroughly in Section 5. In particular, we question how subjects use the information
available to them and how/why they deviate from the predictions of the theory.
4.1 The First Subject
The decision problem of the subjects in the first position is simple: if a subject is informed
with signal σ1 ∈ {−1, 1}, he should optimally follow his own signal and choose a1 = σ1; if
his signal is uninformative, i.e., σ = 0 (in the pi treatment), then randomization seems to
be a natural way to determine the action.
Table 3: The Behavior of the Informed First Subject
fi pi
σ1 ∈ {−1, 1}
Number of errors 9 51
Number of decisions 360 236
Frequency 2.5% 21.6%
Table 3 summarizes the behavior of the informed subjects in the first round. One striking
observation is the difference in the number of errors between the fi and pi treatments. In
the fi treatment there are nine cases in which the subjects take an action that conflicts
with their signals. In the pi treatment, this number goes up to 51 out of 236 cases in which
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subjects were informative. It is worth noting that the relatively high frequency of errors is
spread across seven subjects in the first position—but two subjects are responsible for 25 of
the 51 errors.
4.2 The Second Subject
A subject in the second position must make two decisions: a link decision and an action
decision. We summarize our data in three tables: Tables 4, 5, and 7 fully describe the
decomposition of link decisions and action decisions in the fi treatment, the pi treatment
when subjects are informed, and the pi treatment when subjects are uninformed, respectively.
In Table 6 we also compare different aspects of subjects’ behavior across treatments.
4.2.1 fi Treatment
In the fi treatment, the theory predicts that a subject should not form a link unless the cost
is zero. Out of 360 decisions, we observe 239 cases in which subjects do not form a link and
thus make their decisions based on their signals. Among these 239 cases, subjects take the
action that is the same as their signal in 214 instances. In 25 cases, however, they take the
action that is opposite to their signal. Table 4 displays this data.
There are a total of 121 cases in which subjects decide to form a link to the first subject.
However, in 25 of these cases the cost is zero, hence the link decisions are (weakly) optimal.7
In order to distinguish the link decisions that are taken at zero cost, we use the notation
x : y, meaning that x links are formed when the cost is positive and y are formed when the
cost is zero. When there exists a link between the first and the second subject, there are
four different possibilities:
(1) In 61 cases, the subjects observe the same action as their signal, and take
the same action. Thus, even though the link decision is a deviation from the
theory (for 48 of the cases), the resulting action decision is backed up with two
matching pieces of information.
(2) In 21 cases, the subjects observe an action that is different from their signal.
Facing two conflicting pieces of information, they decide to follow their signal.
This is a curious case, because the action choice of the subject makes it even
harder to justify the link decision.
(3) In 35 instances the subjects observe an action different from their signals,
but prefer to follow the first subject’s decision. This is the opposite of the second
7 While it is formally not an error to form a link when the cost is zero, that is not to say that the
information should not be ignored—this is especially true if subjects believe that their predecessors are
prone to make mistakes.
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situation: there they disregard the action of the first subject; here they disregard
their private signal.
(4) Finally, in 4 cases the subjects observe the same action as their signals but
they ignore both the action they observe and their signals by choosing an opposite
action. Such behavior is extremely irrational but, fortunately, it is also quite rare.
Table 4: The Behavior of the Second
Subject in fi Treatment
Number of Subjects
No Link Link
a2 = a1 48:13a2 = σ2 214a2 6= a1 15:6
a2 = a1 30:5a2 6= σ2 25a2 6= a1 3:1
4.2.2 pi Treatment—Informed Subjects
In the pi treatment, there are 244 cases in which the subjects are informed. Out of these
244 cases, subjects in 169 of them do not form a link. This behavior is consistent with
the predictions of the theory. However, in 61 instances subjects decide to form a link even
though the cost is strictly positive.
Table 5: The Behavior of the Second Subject
in pit Treatment: Informed Subjects
Number of Subjects
No Link Link
a2 = a1 31:4a2 = σ2 157a2 6= a1 24:9
a2 = a1 5:0a2 6= σ2 12a2 6= a1 1:1
Table 5 is the same as Table 4, except for informed subjects in pi treatment. The second
column shows the number of subjects in each of the four possibilities that we discussed
earlier. We elaborate more on this in the next subsection as we compare the behavior of
informed subjects in the pi and fi treatments.
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4.2.3 Comparison of Informed Subjects in pi and fi Treatments
To compare the two treatments, we provide in Table 6 the frequency of the decisions in each.
Although subjects tend to form links slightly less often in the pi treatment, the difference is
not statistically distinguishable.
However, there is one notable compositional difference between the two treatments that
is statistically significant. Specifically, we observe that subjects tend to give more weight to
their own signal in the pi treatment than in the fi treatment. In the fi treatment, subjects
form a link, observe an action different from their signal, and take an action consistent with
their signal, 5.83 percent of the time. This goes up to 13.52 percent in the pi treatment.
Similarly, in the fi treatment subjects form a link, observe an action different from their
signal, but take an action consistent with the action they observe 9.72 percent of the time;
that percentage goes down to 2.05 in the pi treatment.
Table 6: The Frequency of Links by Informed
Subjects in the fi and pi Treatments.
fi Treatment pi Treatment
No Link Link No Link Link
a2 = a1 16.94% 14.34%a2 = σ2 59.44% 64.34%a2 6= a1 5.83% 13.52%
a2 = a1 9.72% 2.05%a2 6= σ2 6.94% 4.92%a2 6= a1 1.11% .08%
Total 66.39% 33.61% 69.26% 30.24%
Observation 1. Linking behavior is not substantially different across treatments. However,
it deviates from the rational benchmark. In contrast, action decisions differ across treat-
ments. Whereas in the pi treatment, subjects who observe an action that conflicts with their
own signal almost always follow their own signal, in the fi treatment there is a noticeable
tendency to conform to the observed action.
4.2.4 pi Treatment—Uninformed Subjects
Recall from Corollary 1 (and Figure 3) that the optimal behavior of the second subject
depends on the level of cost. It turns out that with the parameters of the experiment, an
uninformed subject should always form a link when the cost is less than 11, and should avoid
forming a link when it is above 11. This is how Table 7 organizes the data. From the Table,
we observe that the majority of the decisions are in this line: the number of links when the
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cost is less than the threshold is more than the number of links when the cost is greater than
the threshold.
Table 7: The Behavior of the Second Subject in
pi Treatment: Uninformed Subjects
c < 11 c ≥ 11
Number of Subjects Number of Subjects
No Link Link No Link Link
a2 = a1 33 a2 = a1 917 34
a2 6= a1 16 a2 6= a1 7
The exact threshold cost is c∗ ≃ 11.11.
4.2.5 Responsiveness to Cost
While it is theoretically a mistake for the informed second subject to form a link to the first
at any positive cost, it is a more costly mistake when the cost is higher. Therefore, one
would expect that there is a decrease in the number of links as the cost of forming a link
increases. This is exactly what we find. Figure 6 depicts the observed empirical frequency
of a link forming at each possible cost of link formation. There is strong evidence that the
frequency of link formation decreases as the cost increases.8
Observation 2. While subjects’ linking behavior deviates from the Bayesian benchmark, the
frequency with which links are formed is decreasing with the cost of link formation, as would
be predicted by a relaxed model which allows for stochastic best response.
4.3 The Third Subject
The subjects in the third position face a more complicated problem. In fact, there are two
possible networks that they can observe. In the first network there is a link between the
first and the second subjects, while in the second there is no link between the first and the
second subjects.
We begin our analysis with the link formation behavior of the subjects in the fi treatment.
Table 8 provides these data. Note that when q = 1, as in the fi treatment, the network of
the first type (the second is linked to the first subject) is not an equilibrium network for any
c > 0. Nevertheless, we observe this off-the-equilibrium path network in the experiment. The
first two rows in Table 8 show the behavior of the third subject facing such networks. There
8We will elaborate on this point further in section 4.4.
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Figure 6: Frequency of Link Formation:
Informed Second Subjects
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are 121 networks of this type. Note that in 24 of them, the cost is zero, which rationally
justifies the existence of the link. In all of the cases in which c > 0, the third decides to
form a link 62.5 percent of the time. It is worth analyzing the action behavior of the third in
these situations. Table 9 summarizes the decomposition of the action decisions of the third
subject.
Table 8: The Distribution of Networks in
the fi Treatment
Networks c < 5 c > 5
(3.a) b b b1 2 3 5224 32
(3.b) b b b1 2 3 121 25
(3.g) b b b1 2 3 192 174
(3.c) b b b1 2 3 131 12
(3.d) b b b1 2 3 144 7
The exact threshold cost is c∗∗ ≃ 5.13.
The highlighted cells indicate the equilibrium path decisions and networks.
Let us look first at the case where the third forms a link to the second. If the two actions
that the third observes are the same as his signal, then he always chooses the action that
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matches this information (39 instances versus 0.) If, however, the actions of the second and
third subjects are the same but differ from his signal, then the third subject tends to follow
the actions that he observes more often than his signal (20 instances versus 6 instances.)
Finally, if the actions of the first and the second are different, then his private signal becomes
more decisive. In fact, in 16 cases out of 19, the third subject observes two different actions
and finally takes the same action as his signal.
Table 9: The Decomposition of
Action Decisions in the fi Treatment
Networks a3 = σ3 a3 6= σ3
a1 = a2 = σ3 39 0
(3.a) b b b1 2 3 a1 = a2 6= σ3 6 20
a1 6= a2 16 3
(3.b) b b b1 2 3 29 8
(3.g) b b b1 2 3 167 26
a1 = σ3 20 1(3.c) b b b1 2 3
a1 6= σ3 2 2
a1 = a2 = σ3 4 4
(3.d) b b b1 2 3 a1 = a2 6= σ3 0 0
a1 6= a2 11 2
The other network that the third subject observes is when the second subject does not
form a link to the first (the last three rows in Table 8). In this case, there are three
possibilities for the third subject: either he does not form any links, he forms only one link,
or he forms two links. There are 239 such instances. Among those cases, he does not form
any links 81 percent of the time, he forms a link to the second and stops 10 percent of the
time, and he forms two links 9 percent of the time. Note that, according to the predictions
of the theory, if the cost is greater than 5 the third subject should not form any links. This
indeed happens in 90 percent of those situations. In terms of action decisions, as Table 9
indicates, we do not observe a substantial number of mistakes.
We also undertake the analysis for the pi treatment. Tables 10 and 11 provide a summary
of the data for the pi treatment. The left panel of Table 10 details the networks formed
by informed subjects, whereas the right hand side panel details the networks formed by
uninformed subjects. Table 11 decomposes the informed subjects’ action decisions in the pi
treatment.
Observation 3. There is a substantial difference in linking behavior when the third subject
faces network (2.A) or (2.B). In particular, when the third subject observes a link between
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Table 10: The Distribution of Networks in pi Treatment
σ3 ∈ {−1, 1} σ3 = 0
Networks c < 3 3 < c < 11 c > 11 c < 3 3 < c < 11 c > 11
(3.a) b b b1 2 3 2515 15 2 2111 12 5
(3.b) b b b1 2 3 92 17 17 3 9 5
(3.g) b b b1 2 3 7 35 68 5 12 26
(3.f) b b b1 2 3 0 4 10 2 5 6
(3.d) b b b1 2 3 1 15 11 1 6 6
c∗ ≃ 11.11 and c∗∗ ≃ 3.41.
The highlighted cells indicate the equilibrium path decisions and networks.
Table 11: The Decomposition of Action Decisions in
pi Treatment—Informed Subjects
Networks a3 = σ3 a3 6= σ3
a1 = a2 = σ3 17 0
(3.a) b b b1 2 3 a1 = a2 6= σ3 5 9
a1 6= a2 11 0
(3.b) b b b1 2 3 41 2
(3.g) b b b1 2 3 103 7
a1 = σ3 12 1(3.c) b b b1 2 3
a1 6= σ3 0 1
a1 = a2 = σ3 4 0
(3.d) b b b1 2 3 a1 = a2 6= σ3 1 6
a1 6= a2 14 2
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the first and the second (network (2.A)), he is very likely to form a link, whereas when the
third subject observes that no link has been formed (network (2.B)), he is very unlikely to
form a link.
Observation 3 is remarkable because, at least in the pi treatment, the latter network
signals that the second subject was informed, while the former network signals that he
was uninformed. Therefore, the Bayesian model would predict a higher frequency of link
formation in the latter network than in the former network.
4.4 Observed Network & Link Decisions
Finally, we want to understand the relationship between the observed network and the link
decisions of the third and fourth subjects. Specifically, we look at the binary decision of
forming at least one link and how it depends upon the observed network. Tables 12 and
13 report the results of a series of estimations. The variable informed is a dummy variable
which takes the value 1 if the subject was informed and zero otherwise. Similarly, variables
depicted as networks are dummy variables which take the value 1 if the subject observes
that particular network and zero otherwise. The variable link cost is simply the cost
of link formation. For each information treatment, we first report the results of a logit
estimation (coded as .1) and then the results of a fixed-effect logit estimation (coded as .2)
which allows for subject heterogeneity. Clearly, allowing for subject heterogeneity does not
change the results qualitatively, but it does change the magnitude of the effects; in particular,
by including the fixed-effects terms, we derive estimated coefficients that are substantially
larger in absolute value.
These tables reinforce some points that we have already made in our descriptive analysis.
First, as was apparent in Figure 6 for the second subject, the negative coefficient on link
cost for the third and fourth subjects shows that the greater is the cost of forming links, the
lower is the probability that they will be formed. Second, informed subjects are less likely to
form links than their uninformed counterparts, although this is only marginally significant
for the fourth subject. Notice, too that the estimated coefficients on the network dummies
are almost always smaller in the pi treatment than in the fi treatment. Thus our subjects
do have a sense that information matters, even if they tend to form links more often than
the theory predicts.
However, there is information in these tables. First, notice that Observation 3 carries
through to the fourth subject. In both treatments and for all specifications, the estimated
coefficient on the dummy for network 3.a is substantially larger than that of network 2.a.
Therefore, there is a strong tendency towards what we call herding in link formation.
Finally, there is further evidence that subjects understand the informativeness of networks, at
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Table 12: Logit Regressions: Third Subject
fi.1 fi.2 pi.1 pi.2
informed
na na -0.607 -1.964
na na (0.238) (0.453)
(2.a) b b1 2
1.562 2.559 0.703 2.217
(0.298) (0.497) (0.252) (0.478)
link cost
-0.247 -0.404 -0.076 -0.226
(0.031) (0.053) (0.021) (0.045)
constant
0.867 na 0.447 na
(0.298) na (0.319) na
LL -146.88 -67.87 -220.61 -71.86
N 360 360 360 360
Estimated standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 13: Logit Regressions: Fourth Subject
fi.1 fi.2 pi.1 pi.2
informed
na na -0.453 -0.535
na na (0.296) (0.361)
b b b(3.b) 1 2 3
0.160 0.866 1.211 1.930
(0.435) (0.537) (0.371) (0.485)
(3.a) b b b1 2 3
5.069 6.589 1.930 2.922
(1.034) (1.305) (0.378) (0.506)
(3.d) b b b1 2 3
3.472 5.432 3.086 3.823
(1.065) (1.393) (0.467) (0.669)
(3.c) b b b1 2 3
2.246 3.708 1.034 1.307
(0.624) (0.906) (0.518) (0.672)
link cost
-0.160 -0.162 -0.158 -0.242
(0.033) (0.037) (0.027) (0.038)
constant
0.376 na 0.238 na
(0.402) na (0.397) na
LL -122.05 -84.48 -170.09 -103.46
N 360 360 360 360
Estimated standard errors are in parentheses.
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least across treatments. For the fi treatment compare the estimated coefficients on the (non-
equilibrium) network 3.b and the (equilibrium) network 3.f. The coefficient is substantially
and significantly larger in the latter case, indicating a greater propensity to form a link when
faced with this network than the out-of-equilibrium network 3.b.9
5 Econometric Analysis
In the previous sections, we described behavior of the second, third, and fourth subjects
in various situations. Although the behavior clearly deviates from the fully rational theory
as espoused by the bslp, we argue that it can be rationalized in the sense that there are
systematic patterns of behavior that can be modeled. In particular, as the Bayesian theory
predicts, the cost of link formation matters: the higher the cost, the less likely links are to
be formed. Information matters: often behavior is substantially different between the fi and
pi treatments. Finally, the structure of links (i.e., the network) matters—even if it matters
differently than the Bayesian theory predicts.
Our goal in this section is to derive and estimate a parsimonious model of behavior that
explains the key patterns of behavior described in our descriptive analysis. Our discussion
will focus almost exclusively on the second and third subjects. Clearly, there is very little to
be said about the first subject. The analysis of behavior for the fourth subject is exceedingly
complex and, moreover, we have very few observations for each network. We begin with
the standard Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) model of behavior and show that we
can reject the rational model. Then, we extend the model by modifying the preferences of
agents for incorporating the effects of local interactions via the relative income hypothesis
a` la Duesenberry [14]. In this way, we are able to describe subjects’ linking and action
decisions better than the QRE model.
5.1 A Model of Stochastic Best Response
5.1.1 The Second Agent
In the standard model of stochastic best response, agents experience a random shock to each
of their possible decisions. For simplicity, consider the second agent receiving signal σ2 = 1.
Let ℓi,j = 0, 1 denote the existence of a link between the i
th and the jth agents when j > i.
There exists a link between them if and only if ℓi,j = 1. The expected utility of forming a
9 Interestingly, for both networks and across both treatments, the fourth subject almost always forms
a link to the larger sub-network, rather than to the most informative node. Thus, subjects would seem
to prefer to observe more action decisions, even if, from a strictly informative point of view, doing so is
suboptimal.
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link is given by:
ϕ(σ2 = 1, ℓ1,2 = 1) := rmax
{
sm, (1− s)m
}
+ (1− r)max
{
tm, (1− t)m
}
− c+ ǫ1 (6)
where r = Pr(a1 = 1|σ2 = 1), s = Pr(θ = 1|σ2 = a1 = 1) and t = Pr(θ = 1|σ2 = 1, a1 = −1).
Whereas the expected utility of not forming a link is given by:
ϕ(σ2 = 1, ℓ1,2 = 1) = max
{
pm, (1− p)m
}
+ ǫ0 (7)
where p = Pr(θ = 1|σ2 = 1). Under standard assumptions on ǫ1 and ǫ0, the probability that
a link is formed is given by:
Pr(ℓ1,2 = 1|σ2, c) =
[
1 + exp
{
λl
(
ϕ(σ2, ℓ1,2 = 0)− ϕ(σ2, ℓ1,2 = 1)
)}]−1
(8)
where λl is a parameter to estimate and captures the subject’s ability to best-respond in his
link decision.
From these equations, one can easily write the likelihood function given a set of observa-
tions and obtain the maximum likelihood estimates of the model. This is precisely what the
left panel of Table 14 depicts. Before discussing these results, however, recall that subjects
make an action decision as well as a link decision and, as we have seen, this is another source
of errors in decision making. In this case, the probability that the second subject will take
an action depends upon his signal and the first subject’s action choice whenever there is a
link. For example,
Pr(a2 = 1|σ2 = 1, a1 = 1) =
[
1 + exp
{
λa(1− 2s)m
}]−1
(9)
where λa is a parameter to be estimated and captures the subject’s ability to best respond in
his action decision. By taking the action decision into account, we can write the full likelihood
function for the subject’s decision problem and obtain maximum likelihood estimates of
λl, λa. The results of this exercise are reported in the right panel of Table 14.
There are a number of points worth making. First, likelihood ratio tests easily allow us
to reject the hypothesis that behavior is purely random (i.e., that the λ’s are all zero).10
Second, the Bayesian model also is easily rejected (i.e., that the λ’s are infinite).11 Third,
λl > λa, implying that subjects are more likely to make an erroneous action decision than
link decision. This effect is particularly pronounced in the fi treatment and much less so
10 The calculated LR statistics are, respectively, 101.3, 96.5, 328.3 and 351.5, while the 5% critical values
are χ2(1) = 3.841 and χ2(2) = 5.991.
11 We approximated the Bayesian model by taking λl = λa = 8. The calculated LR statistics are,
respectively, 250.0, 203.9, 928.5 and 513.3.
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Table 14: Estimation Results: Second Subject
Pure QRE
Link Only Link & Actions
fi pi fi pi
λl 2.160 2.362 2.160 2.362
λa na na 1.185 1.805
LL -198.9 -201.3 -334.900 -323.30
N 360 360 360 360
in the pi treatment. We have two explanations for this observation. First, we assumed
that the second subject correctly anticipates that the first will make errors.12 Therefore, in
the event that σ2 6= a1, it is strictly optimal to follow one’s signal. However, as we saw in
the descriptive analysis, over half the time σ2 6= a1 and the second subjects actually chose
a2 = a1. We assert that this is not so much an error but a behavioral pattern that deserves
further exploration.
Remark 1. Note that λl’s are the same in the Link Only and the Link & Actions spec-
ifications. This is because of the independence of errors in the link and action decisions.
Alternatively, one may argue that, for example,
ϕ(σ2 = 1, ℓ1,2 = 1) = rmax {sm+ ǫ1, (1− s)m+ ǫ2}+(1−r)max {tm+ ǫ1, (1− t)m+ ǫ2}−c
so that, before his link decision, the second agent receives a preference shock in each of his
possible action decisions. The realization of these preference shocks not only determine his
eventual action decision, but also determine his link decision. This substantially complicates
the estimation, since it is no longer possible to obtain closed form solutions for the probability
of any given action. Nevertheless, we were able to estimate by drawing vectors of random
numbers, ǫi, from a type I extreme-value distribution with parameter λ. The results we
obtained are roughly similar to what we report here. Also, perhaps more importantly, it is
hard to justify that this is the correct approach. As Table 14 shows, and from our descriptive
analysis, there are clear differences between the link and action decisions.
5.1.2 The Third Agent
The empirical analysis of the third agent is in the same spirit as that of the second agent.
However, matters are substantially more complicated. In particular, the third agent may
12 That is, the anticipated error rate, 1− δ1, is the empirical error rate from our data set. For example,
Pr(a1 = 1|θ = 1) =
2q
3 δ1 +
q
3 (1 − δ1) +
1−q
2 , where, for the fi treatment, q = 1 and δ1 = 0.975.
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face one of two different networks and has the option of forming 0, 1, or 2 links to his
predecessors. Instead of giving a full derivation of the empirical choice model, we simply
note the key steps required.
In addition to the required calculations from the previous section, we need more tedious
calculations to be able to solve for the value of information. The task is even more com-
plicated, since we assume that the third agent anticipates the errors made by the first and
second agents. For example, consider the case in which the third agent observes that the
second linked to the first. For ease of exposition, let us introduce the following notation:
Pr(a1, a2|σ3, ℓ1,2 = 1)
(a1, a2) σ3
−1 0 1
( 1, 1) a11 a12 a13
( 1,−1) a21 a22 a23
(−1, 1) a31 a32 a33
(−1,−1) a41 a42 a43
Pr(θ = 1|a1, a2, σ3, ℓ1,2 = 1)
(a1, a2) σ3
−1 0 1
( 1, 1) c11 c12 c13
( 1,−1) c21 c22 c23
(−1, 1) c31 c32 c33
(−1,−1) c41 c42 c43
Then, the ex ante expected utility of the third, who observes a link between the first and
the second, is
ϕj = a1j max
{
c1jm, (1− c1j)m
}
+ a2j max
{
c2jm, (1− c2j)m
}
+a3j max
{
c3jm, (1− c3j)m
}
+ a4j max
{
c4jm, (1− c4j)m
}
,
where j = 1 for σ3 = −1, j = 2 for σ3 = 0, and j = 3 for σ3 = 1, and an informed third
agent will form a link if and only if:
max
{
pm, (1− p)m
}
+ ǫ1 < ϕj − c+ ǫ0.
If no link is observed, then the decision is even more complicated, because now the agent
must decide whether to link to the first agent, second agent, or not at all; then, if he decides
to link, he must decide whether to form another link, and only then to make his action
decision.
In Table 15 we report the results of two different estimations for the third subjects’s link
decision. The first column considers the simpler problem in which the third subject observes
a link between the first and the second subjects. The second column considers only the
third agent’s first link decision, whether or not the second subject linked to the first. We
do not want to go into too much detail here. However, there are a couple of points that we
would like to make. First, it is again the case that we can easily reject, with one exception,
both the random behavior, λl = 0, and the fully rational behavior, λl = ∞, in favor of the
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model of stochastic best response.13 The second point, which is particularly striking in the
fi treatment, is the difference in λl in the first and the second columns. As we saw in the
descriptive analysis, when the second agent linked to the first, the third agent was very likely
to form a link—very often this is a mistake. Table 8 shows that λl is substantially higher
when we consider the more general linking problem. When there was no link between the
first and second agents, it was rare that the third formed a link if the cost was above the
threshold. Therefore, we add to the mix a great number of instances in which the third
agent took the correct action. Why does this result not appear to hold in the pi treatment?
Probably because the decision problem is generally more difficult and, moreover, the aversion
to forming links when the second did not link to the first appears to persist, even though
linking would more often be optimal. If no link is observed, then the decision is still more
complicated because the agent must decide whether to link to the first agent, second agent,
or not at all. Then, if he decides to link, he must decide whether to form another link, and
only then to make his action decision.
Table 15: Estimation Results: Third Subject
Pure QRE
fi pi
ℓ1,2 = 1 ℓ1,2 ∈ {0, 1} ℓ1,2 = 1 ℓ1,2 ∈ {0, 1}
λl 1.184 4.361 1.983 2.249
LL -82.330 -207.98 -87.54 -285.2
N 121 360 140 360
Remark 2. We also could consider the full linking problem; however, we choose not to for
two reasons. First, it was very rare that subjects actually formed two links. Second, of the
subjects that did form two links, the first link was always to the first subject. Moreover, in
the pi treatment, two subjects were responsible for all but two of these instances, while in the
fi treatment, two subjects were responsible for the vast majority of cases.14
5.2 A Model of Local Interactions
The QRE model in Section 5.1 formally demonstrates the existence of deviations from ra-
tional behavior; however, any deviation is simply termed a mistake and manifests itself as a
13 The calculated LR statistics, going from left to right, for the λl = 0 hypothesis are: 3.1, 276.9, 19.0 and
107.1, while for the λl =∞ hypotheses they are: 69.3, 61.8, 79.9 and 308.7. The one exception noted above
is that we cannot reject the random behavior hypothesis for the case in which the third agent observed a
link between the first and second in the fi treatment.
14Estimation results for the full link decision problem are available upon request.
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lower estimate of λ. But why do subjects in the second position link over 30% of the time,
while at the same time showing a tendency to conform in the fi treatment but not in the
pi treatment? The baseline model of stochastic best response is not able to capture this.
The purpose of this section therefore is to generalize our model in order to better capture
behavior.
5.2.1 The Second Agent
We reformulate the utility function of the subjects in order to account for possible preferences
for relative well-being. In a way, we modify the preferences to incorporate the relative income
hypothesis, a` la Duesenberry [14], which simply states that people often care more about
their relative well being than their absolute well being.15 In an axiomatic study, Ok and
Koc¸kesen [31] proposes the following representation under some plausible axioms on the
relation %:
(a, y) % (b, x) if and only if
a
µ(a, y)
≥
b
µ(a, x)
.
This representation states that an individual who satisfies the axioms prefers a wealth level
a when the wealth distribution of the peer groups is given by a vector y, to a wealth level b
when the wealth distribution of the peer groups is x, if and only if the ratio of the individual’s
wealth a to average income µ(a, y) is larger than the ratio of the individual’s wealth b to
average income µ(b, x). The representation is silent in the existence of risk. Nevertheless,
having been inspired by this representation, we propose the following utility function for the
second agent:
U(a2, a1; θ, σ) := u(a2; θ) + v(a1, a2; θ, σ),
where u is given by
u(a2; θ) :=
{
m if a2 = θ
0 otherwise
and v is the relative utility specified as
v(a2, a1; θ, σ) :=
{
ǫ0 if ℓ1,2 = 0,
αE(u(a2;θ)|σ)
E(u(a1;θ)|σ)
+ ǫ1 if ℓ1,2 = 1.
That is, if the second agent forms a link to the first, he gets a utility kick of α times his relative
standing vis-a`-vis the first agent. Notice that this model generalizes the QRE model of the
previous subsection—if α = 0, second subject’s relative standing does not matter and we are
back to the standard case. In the specification above, ǫ1, ǫ0 are random preference shocks.
We assume that they are independently distributed according to the Type I extreme-value
15 For a literature review of the literature see Ok and Koc¸kesen [31] and the references therein.
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distributions, with parameter λ1.
Suppose, for example, σ2 = 1. If no link is formed, then his expected utility is pm+ ǫ0,
where p = Pr(θ = 1|σ2 = 1). On the other hand, if he forms a link, then his ex ante expected
utility is:
ϕ = rmax
{
sm+ α, (1− s)m+ α
(1− s)m
sm
}
+(1− r)max
{
tm+ α
tm
(1− t)m
, (1− t)m+ α
}
+ ǫ1
= ϕ′ + ǫ1
where r, s, and t are as in section 5.1.1. It is clear that the second agent will link if the
following inequality is satisfied:
pm+ ǫ0 ≤ ϕ
′ + ǫ1 − c.
Again, one can easily write the likelihood function for the entire data set and obtain the
Maximum Likelihood estimates of α and λl.
As with our QRE specification above, we also can make use of choice data. Specifically,
for all those who have formed a link to the first subject, we can calculate the probability that
he will take any particular action. Consider the case in which σ2 = a1 = 1. The expected
utility from conforming, i.e., a2 = 1, is sm+α+ ǫc. On the other hand, the expected utility
of not conforming is: (1− s)(m+ α
s
) + ǫn. The probability of conforming is then given by:
Pr(a2 = 1|σ2 = a1 = 1) = Pr
(
sm+ α + ǫc −
(
(1− s)
(
m+
α
s
)
+ ǫn
)
≥ 0
)
= Pr
(
ǫ˜ ≥ (1− 2s)
(
m+
α
s
))
.
Now consider the case in which σ2 6= a1 = 1. The expected utility from conforming is
(1−t)m+α+ǫc. On the other hand, the expected utility of not conforming is: t(m+
α
1−t
)+ǫn.
The probability of conforming is then given by:
Pr(a2 = 1|σ2 6= a1 = 1) = Pr
(
(1− t)m+ α + ǫc −
(
t
(
m+
α
1− t
) + ǫn
)
≥ 0
)
= Pr
(
ǫ˜ ≥ −(1− 2t)
(
m+
α
1− t
))
.
As earlier, we assume that ǫc and ǫn are independently distributed with a Type I extreme-
value distribution with parameter λa, where λl 6= λa to reflect potentially different best-
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response frequencies for link and action decisions. Given this, one can write the full log-
likelihood as: Pr(choice|link decision) · Pr(link decision) and estimate the parameters of the
model. For both the fi and pi treatments, the results are presented in Table 16.
Table 16: Estimation Results:
Second Subject
Link Only Link & Actions
fi pi fi pi
α 0.236 0.192 0.232 0.194
λl 3.643 3.894 3.623 3.905
λa na na 1.168 1.763
LL -190.22 -190.1 -326.77 -311.45
N 360 360 360 360
There are a number of interesting observations here. First, notice that likelihood ratio
tests easily allow us to reject the null hypothesis that α = 0 in all cases.16 A more important
observation is the fact that the α’s are estimated to be the same whether we use only linking
data or linking and choice data.17 This provides our model with an extra degree of external
validity, for it is able to explain: 1) why subjects form links, and 2) why subjects have a
tendency to conform in the fi treatment but not in the pi treatment. For example, one
may be tempted to say that subjects have a preference for conformity. In the fi treatment,
this could accurately rationalize the data. However, in the pi treatment, one would need an
ex ante preference for conformity (to explain the linking behavior) and an unanticipated ex
post Bayes rationality (to explain choice behavior). Our model succeeds in explaining both
facts with one parameter.
Notice that λa is not significantly different in this specification than in the QRE specifi-
cation, even though more action decisions are being labeled correct. However, since α > 0,
the payoff difference between the correct and incorrect actions is widened and, therefore, the
same λa generates greater accuracy. On the other hand, notice that λl is significantly higher
in the present specification than in the QRE specification. This may seem to conflict with
the explanation offered for why λa is constant across the two specifications; however, there
is a relatively straightforward explanation. For action decisions, from a strictly Bayesian
perspective, the payoff difference from choosing a2 = 1 or a2 = −1 is not that great if the
second agent’s signal differs from the observed action; therefore, systematic errors in favor
16 For the “Link & Actions” estimation, we obtain LR statistics of 16.2 and 23.64 for the fi and pi
treatments, respectively. For the “Link Only” estimation the LR statistics are 17.28 and 22.44.
17 The LR statistic for the Link Only case is 0.79, while for the Link & Actions case is 0.59. Also, in
neither case can we reject the null hypothesis that αfi = αpi.
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of one action will not bias λa downwards much in the QRE specification. However, again
from a strictly Bayesian perspective, because linking requires the payment of a positive (and
sometimes large cost), systematic deviations toward linking necessarily bias λl downwards,
unless there is something else to compensate by raising the payoff to linking. That something
else is α > 0.
5.2.2 The Third Agent
Just as it was possible to generalize the QRE specification to the third agent, we can do
the same with our model of local interactions. Consider the case in which the third agent
observes that the second linked to the first.18 It can be shown that the ex ante expected
utility of the third who observes a link between the first and the second is:19
ϕj = a1j max
{
c1jm+ α, (1− c1j)m+ α
1− c1j
c1j
}
+a2j max {c2jm+ 2αc2j, (1− c2j)m+ 2α(1− c2j)}
+a3j max {c3jm+ 2αc3j, (1− c3j)m+ 2α(1− c3j)}
+a4j max
{
c4jm+ α
c4j
1− c4j
, (1− c4j)m+ α
}
,
where j = 1 for σ3 = −1, j = 2 for σ3 = 0, and j = 3 for σ3 = 1. Here, aij and cij represent
the same probabilities as in the QRE specification; however, because we assume that agents
anticipate the errors of their predecessors, they will indirectly depend on λl, λa, and α, which
we estimated earlier for the second subject. An informed third agent will form a link if and
only if:
max{pm, (1− p)m}+ ǫ1 < ϕj − c+ ǫ0
As in Table 15, Table 17 reports the results of two different estimations: first, considering
only those instances in which the third subject observes a link between the first and second;
then, considering the third subject’s first link decision problem, regardless of whether there
is a link between the first two subjects. Three points are of immediate interest. First,
for both information treatments, the estimated α declines substantially in the second (more
general) estimation. Second, while α always remains positive for the fi treatment, it becomes
negative (but insignificant) in the pi treatment. Finally, the model appears to fit the data
18 In this case we write the relative utility for the third agent as
v(a3, a2, a1; θ, σ) :=
{
ǫ0 if ℓ2,3 = 0,
α
E(u(a3;θ)|σ)
E(u(a1;θ)|σ)+E(u(a2;θ)|σ)
+ ǫ1 if ℓ2,3 = 1.
19 Details of this and other calculations are available upon request.
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generated from the fi treatment substantially better than that of the pi treatment.
Table 17: Estimation Results:
Third Subject’s Link Decision
fi pi
ℓ1,2 = 1 ℓ1,2 ∈ {0, 1} ℓ1,2 = 1 ℓ1,2 ∈ {0, 1}
α 0.369∗ 0.091∗ 0.227∗ -0.083
λl 3.415
∗ 5.033∗ 2.607∗ 1.974∗
LL -65.668 -204.131 -81.956 -285.190
n 121 360 140 360
∗ Significant at 5% level
Table 17 lends further support to what was apparent in the descriptive analysis: sub-
jects in the third position view their decision problem substantially differently depending on
whether they observe a link between the first and the second subjects. When they observe
a link, they are very likely to form a link; conversely when they do not observe a link, they
are very unlikely to form a link. To be sure, because the network evolves endogenously, and
subjects in the second position are more likely to form a link for low costs, the third subject
is more likely to observe a link when the cost is low and not to observe a link when the cost
is high (in which case, the Bayesian theory would predict that no link should be formed).
However, our estimation procedure controls for the cost of link formation—yet the apparent
difference remains!
We are at somewhat of a loss to explain this feature of the data. According to bslp,
the reason that subjects in the third position do not form a link upon observing the empty
network is that they realize that by forming one link, they may observe that their linked
subject took the opposite action from his signal, therefore necessitating another link, and
hence the costs of two links. If c is high enough, this tradeoff is simply not worth it. However,
our subjects appear to go beyond even what would be predicted by bslp: upon observing
the empty network, they only link infrequently.
5.3 Discussion
Our empirical results suggest that local interactions between subjects are important in driv-
ing the evolution of the network. For the second agent, it appears, the motivating factor
is a desire to compare his standing with that of the first agent. This shows up as a posi-
tive estimate for α and can explain the inflation of links in both treatments, a tendency to
conform in the fi treatment, and the strong incentive to follow one’s own signal despite a
contradictory observation. Eliaz and Schotter [15] experimentally study a problem similar
to the second agent’s: A prize is in Urn A with probability h in the high state and with
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probability l ∈ (1
2
, h) in the low state; in either state, the prize is in Urn B with complemen-
tary probability. Subjects can pay a cost, c > 0, in order to learn whether the state is high
or low. As in our setting, the subjects should never pay the cost because choosing Urn A is
always better than choosing Urn B. Similar to us, they find a substantial number of subjects
who are willing to pay for this information, and argue that subjects have a preference over
beliefs. While this could explain some of our results, it cannot explain why many subjects
actually conformed to the first subject, even though it went against their own signal. Thus,
in our experiment, the information gained by forming a link was often decisive.
Eliaz and Schotter [15] discuss two alternative explanations: the “disjunction effect”
of Tversky and Shafir [34] and Kreps and Porteus’ [25] preference for early resolution of
uncertainty. It is difficult to see how the latter explanation could rationalize our data,
because the act of forming a link does not actually resolve any uncertainty about the state
of the world. The disjunction effect, which posits that subjects do not fully anticipate their
final decision when making their initial link decision, also has some merit; however, we
believe it fails on two grounds: first, like Eliaz and Schotter [15], it cannot explain why the
information gained from linking is sometimes decisive. Second, since subjects played the
network formation game forty times, we would expect any disjunction effect to dampen over
time as subjects learn. However, we found no such tendency in our data. Therefore, we
believe that our explanation remains the leading one.20
For the third subject, matters are more complicated because now subjects can condition
their behavior on one of two networks; indeed, when faced with the empty network they
must consider the possibility that if they form one link, they may form subsequent links.
Here we saw the importance of the network: when the second linked to the first, the third
was very likely to link (hence α > 0), but when the second did not link to the first, the third
was much less likely to link (hence the dramatic drop in α). It is of interest here to examine
subject heterogeneity in order to determine the reasons for the decline in α. In Table 18, we
re-estimated our empirical model for the third agent but allowed for a subject-specific α.
Three things are apparent. First, there is a great deal of variation in the estimated α’s
across subjects. Second, going from the network with a link between the first and second
subject to the one without a link, the estimated α diminishes in all but one case, sometimes
becoming negative. Why this uniform drop in α? Two explanations come to mind: either
subjects in the third position like to mimic the link decision of the second, or the prospect
of having to form two links scares them away from forming any links. Finally, it is apparent
that allowing for subject heterogeneity dramatically improves the model’s fit; however, it
20From the discussion in Remark 1, one could argue that our empirical model already contains a disjunction
effect. While this is a valid point, it was done largely for empirical convenience. As was discussed above, the
empirical results are qualitatively similar if we estimate the more complicated model discussed in Remark 1;
i.e., we still obtain α > 0.
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Table 18: Estimation Results: Subject-Specific α’s
fi pi
ℓ1,2 = 1 ℓ1,2 ∈ {0, 1} ℓ1,2 = 1 ℓ1,2 ∈ {0, 1}
λ 6.701 7.445 3.807 4.114
α1 0.935 0.458 0.680 1.884
α2 0.319 0.156 0.811 0.678
α3 0.019 -0.068 -0.246 -0.518
α4 0.725 0.505 0.138 -0.281
α5 0.281 0.188 -0.382 -0.523
α6 0.466 0.242 0.276 -0.138
α7 0.120 0.053 0.933 0.430
α8 -0.239 -0.250 0.126 -0.067
α9 -1.276 -1.833 -0.384 -0.516
LL -35.293 -137.134 -49.806 -162.994
N 121 360 140 360
does not alter the qualitative results, with one exception: it is not true that all subjects are
averse to forming links when faced with the empty network (as one might conclude from
Table 17), but rather there appears to be a mixture of behavioral types.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we present the results of an experiment on endogenous network formation.
Not surprisingly, there were substantial deviations from the Bayesian theory. In particular,
subjects in the second position tended to form many links; in some instances there was a
tendency to conform to the decision of one’s predecessor; the observed network was extremely
important in driving linking behavior; and, rather than linking to the most informative node,
subjects tended to prefer linking to larger networks. There was also a noticeable pattern
of herding in link formation. However, behavior did conform to many of our expectations:
the frequency of link formation was negatively related to the cost, and there were important
differences in behavior between the fi and pi treatments, suggesting that subjects do grasp
certain aspects of information transmission through the networks.
All of our results suggest that local interactions matter: whether in their link or action
decisions, people emulate their predecessors and are heavily influenced by what they observe.
Indeed, the empirical model in Section 5.2, in which subjects are motivated to form links
because they care about their relative standing, does an excellent job of rationalizing the
data. This suggests that there is value in seeking out further connections between the social
learning/network formation literature and the literature on local interactions—both in terms
of theory and experimental design.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Omitted Proofs
Corollary 1. The optimal decision rule of the second agent is characterized as follows:
1. Let σ2 ∈ {−1, 1} and q ∈ (0, 1]. For any c > 0, the second agent does not form a link and
takes action a2 = σ2.
2. Let σ2 = 0 and q ∈ (0, 1]. There exists a threshold c
∗ = qm6 such that for any c < c
∗, the
second agent links to the first and takes action a2 = a1; if c ≥ c
∗, the second agent does not
form a link and randomizes between the two actions.
Proof. a
1. Let q ∈ (0, 1], and without loss of generality, suppose that σ2 = 1. Then, the value of
information from linking to the first agent when the unit cost of a link is c > 0 is
v(σ2) =
∑
a1
Pr(a1|σ2)max
a2
{∑
θ
Pr(θ|σ2, a1)u(a2, θ)
}
−max
a2
{∑
θ
Pr(θ|σ2)u(a2, θ)
}
− c
=
∑
a1
Pr(a1|σ2)
∑
θ
Pr(θ|σ2, a1)u(1, θ)−
∑
θ
Pr(θ|σ2)u(1, θ)− c < 0
The second equality comes from the fact that choosing a2 = 1 is always optimal, regardless
of a1 and hence the first two terms are canceled out. Therefore, it is never optimal to form
a link to the first agent for any positive unit cost c > 0. The case of σ2 = −1 is similar.
2. Let q ∈ (0, 1], and suppose that σ2 = 0. Then a simple computation leads the value of
information from linking to the first agent to be
v(σ2) =
qm
6
− c.
Therefore, when c < qm6 the second agent forms a link to the first. However, when c ≥
qm
6
the second agent does not form a link.
Corollary 2. The optimal decision rule of the third agent is characterized as follows:
1. Suppose there is a link between the first and the second agents.
(a) Let σ3 ∈ {−1, 1} and q ∈ (0, 1]. Then, for any c > 0 the third agent does not form a
link and takes action a3 = σ3.
(b) Let σ3 = 0 and q ∈ (0, 1]. Then, for any c < c
∗ the third agent links to the second and
takes action a3 = a2; if c ≥ c
∗, the third agent does not form a link and randomizes
between the two actions.
2. Suppose there is no link between the first and the second agents.
(a) Let σ3 ∈ {−1, 1} and q ∈ (0, 1].
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i. There exists a threshold c∗∗ = 2qm39 such that for any c < c
∗∗, the third agent links
to the second agent. If a2 = σ3, then he does not form a link to the first and takes
action a3 = a2; if a2 6= σ3, then he links to the first and takes action a3 = a1.
ii. For any c ≥ c∗∗(q,m) the third agent does not form a link and takes action a3 = σ3.
(b) Let σ3 = 0 and q ∈ (0, 1].
i. For any c < c∗ the third agent links to the second and takes action a3 = a2.
ii. For any c ≥ c∗, the third agent does not form a link and randomizes between the
two actions.
Proof. a
1. Suppose there is a link between the first and the second agents. When there is a link between
the first and the second agents, the decision problem of the third agent is equivalent to that
of the second agent (see the proof of Corollary 1.)
2. Suppose that there is no link the first and the second agents.
(a) Let σ3 ∈ {−1, 1} and q ∈ (0, 1].
i. The value of information is
v(σ3) = −c+
∑
a2
Pr(a2|σ3)max{v(σ3, a2), 0}
= −c+
4
9
(
qm
6
− c
)
=
2qm
27
−
13
9
c.
Therefore, when c < 2qm39 we have v(σ3) > 0, hence the third agent links to the
second agent. If a2 = σ3, the value of information is v(σ2, σ3) = v(σ2); hence the
third does not form a link. If a2 6= σ3, then the value of information is equivalent
to v(σ3 = 0). We already know that in this case the third forms a link.
ii. If c ≥ 2qm39 we have v(σ3) < 0, hence the third agent does not form a link to the
second agent.
(b) Let σ3 = 0 and q ∈ (0, 1].
i. The value of information is
v(σ2) =
∑
a2
Pr(a2|σ3)max
a3
{∑
θ
Pr(θ|σ3, a2)u(a3, θ)
}
−max
a3
{∑
θ
Pr(θ|σ3)u(a3, θ)
}
− c+
∑
a2
Pr(a2|σ3)max{v(σ3, a2), 0} =
m
6
− c,
where v(σ3, a2) < 0 for any (σ3, a2). Thus, for 0 < c <
qm
6 , it is optimal to form a
link to the second agent. After forming a link, for any action he observes, the value
of information for the third agent is identical to that of an informed second agent.
Therefore, the third does not form a link to the first, and takes action a3 = a2 (see
the proof of Corollary 1.) and follow his action decision.
ii. When c ≥ qm6 , the value is v(σ3) < 0. Therefore, the third does not form a link to
the second agent.
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Appendix B: Instructions
General Instructions
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Your earnings will depend partly on
your decisions and partly on chance. By following the instructions and making careful decisions
you will earn varying amounts of money, which will be paid at the end of the experiment. Details
of how you will make decisions and earn money will be provided below.
In this experiment, you will participate in 40 independent rounds, each of which contains four
decision positions in a decision queue. In each round you will be asked which of two urns has been
randomly chosen (called action decision); however, before making your action decision, some sub-
jects will be able to observe the actions of those who have gone before them (called link decision(s))
by paying a cost that will be determined by the computer at the beginning of each round.
Before the first round, you will be randomly assigned to a position in the decision queue labeled 1,
2, 3 or 4. One-fourth of the participants will be randomly assigned to each of the four positions.
Your position depends solely on chance and will remain constant in all rounds throughout the
experiment. When you are called to make decisions, in the center of the computer screen you will
be informed of your position and any link decisions made by those in preceding decision positions;
however, you will not observe their action decisions.
A Decision Round
Each round starts by having the computer randomly form groups of four participants by selecting
one participant from each of the four positions. The groups formed in each round depend only on
chance and are independent of the groups formed in any of the other rounds.
In each round you will be asked to predict which of two urns, labeled A and B, has been chosen.
For each group of four, it is equally likely that urn A or urn B will be chosen. Urn A contains
2 balls labeled A and 1 ball labeled B. Urn B contains 2 balls labeled B and 1 ball
labeled A.
To help you determine which urn has been selected, you will be allowed to observe one ball, drawn
at random, from the urn at no cost. In addition, if you are in position 2, 3 or 4, you will be given
a chance to see action decisions in preceding positions at a cost determined by the experimental
software.
Your private draw in each round is independent of the draw received by any other participant. The
result of your draw will be your private information and should not be shared with any of the other
participants. You will see your private draw in the middle portion of the computer screen.
After each draw, the ball will be returned to the urn before making a private draw
for the next participant. This is done by the experimental software.
Participants assigned to position 1 may see the following screen on your computer screen:
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 In this case, since you are in the first position in a decision queue, all you need to do is make your
action decision based on your private information. This is done at the bottom of the screen by
simply clicking on either A or B.
For participants assigned to positions 2, 3 and 4, there will be other participants in the same
group who have already made their action and link decisions. In addition to your private draw, you
will have the opportunity to observe the action decisions of those in preceding positions at a cost
determined by the experimental software at the beginning of each round. When it is your turn to
move, you will see a graphical representation of all the link decisions made by those who precede
you in the decision queue.
For example, suppose that you are assigned to position 3 in the queue. You may see the following
screen:
In this example, your private draw was a ball labeledA. In addition, you observe that the participant
in the second position chose not to form a link to the first position. That is, the participant in
the second position predicted which urn was more likely to be chosen, while having chosen not to
observe the action decision by the participant in the first position.
Continue with the example above and suppose that you wish to form a link to the second position.
To do this, simply click on the box labeled 2. Then you will observe the action decision made by
the participant in position 2 while incurring the cost of forming a link. This is depicted below:
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Note that once you form a link to one preceding participant, you see not only his/her
action choice but also the action choices of all those with whom that person linked.
For example, suppose that the second person had actually formed a link to the first person in the
queue. In this situation, by forming a link to the second position in the queue you would see the
action decisions of both participants in the first and the second positions in the queue.
In this example, if you wish to observe more information, you may form a link to the first position,
at an additional cost, and observe his or her action decision. If not, and you are ready to make
your decision, simply click on the box labeled A or B at the bottom of your screen, corresponding
to which urn you think was more likely to have been chosen.
Once you have made your decision for that round, you will be informed which urn was actually
used and what your potential payoffs are for that round. By clicking on the OK button you will
be taken to a waiting screen and then the next person in the line will be able to make his or her
decisions.
This concludes one decision round. All of the participants will then be randomly placed into a new
group of four people. In total, you will repeat 40 independent rounds with various levels of costs.
Remember: In each round, the same urn applies to all members of a group. That is, the experi-
mental software picks one urn for each group in each round.
Cost of Forming Links
Now, we will describe in detail how the cost of forming a link will be determined in each of the
40, independent, rounds. In all rounds throughout the experiment, the cost of forming a link can
be any even number between 0 and 20, inclusive; that is, the cost will be one of the following
numbers, 0, 2, 4, . . ., 16, 18, 20.
In each round, the computer will randomly assign a cost to each group of four. The chance that
the computer selects any even number between 0 and 20 points is exactly the same. That is, the
chance that a cost of 2 is selected is the same as the chance that a cost of 14 is selected and so on.
Moreover, the cost assigned in one decision round is independent of the cost in any other decision
round.
Remember: The cost of forming a link in each round is the same for all members of a group.
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Moreover, the cost for each link is the same (e.g., If you form one link at a cost of 10 points, you
are free to form another link by paying an additional cost of 10 points.).
Payoffs
Your potential earnings for each round are determined as follows. If you made the correct action
decision regarding which urn was used, you will be awarded 100 points for that round; otherwise,
you will be awarded nothing. From this amount, either 100 or 0, we will subtract the appropriate
cost for each link decision that you made. For example, if, in round 10, the cost of link formation
was 18 points, then in determining your potential earnings for round 10, 18 points will be subtracted,
from either 100 or 0, for every link decision that was made. For example, if, after having made one
link decision, you correctly guessed which urn was chosen, your potential earnings would be 100 -
18 = 82 points.
At the end of the 40 rounds, the experimental software we will randomly select three rounds from
which you will be paid. The total number of points earned will be summed up for each of these
three rounds — 100 points for each correct decision, from which we will subtract the appropriate
number of points for each link decision. This will be converted to a dollar amount according to the
rule:
$1 = 15 points
This amount will then be added to the $8.00 participation fee to give your payment for this ex-
periment. Payments will be made in private via petty cash vouchers at the conclusion of the
session.
Rules
Please do not talk with anyone during the experiment. We ask everyone to remain silent until the
end of the last decision problem.
Your participation in the experiment and any information about your earnings will be kept strictly
confidential. Your receipt of payment and consent form are the only places on which your name will
appear. This information will be kept confidential in the manner described in the consent form.
If you have any questions please ask them now. If not, we will proceed to the experiment.
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